Fraudulent Concealment as Tolling the Antitrust Statute of Limitations by unknown
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 36 Issue 2 Article 6 
1967 
Fraudulent Concealment as Tolling the Antitrust Statute of 
Limitations 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Fraudulent Concealment as Tolling the Antitrust Statute of Limitations, 36 Fordham L. Rev. 328 (1967). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol36/iss2/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT AS TOLLING THE
ANTITRUST STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
In 1955 Congress passed the first federal antitrust statute of limitations.'
Prior to that time, the courts found it necessary to "borrow" the statute of
limitations of the state where the court was sitting.2 This, of course, resulted in
widely divergent limitation periods, 3 and it was with the intention of ending this
anomalous situation 4 that Congress passed section 4B of the Clayton Act which
provides that: "Any action to enforce any cause of action under sections 15 or
15a of this title shall be forever barred unless commenced within four years after
the cause of action accrued." 5 A federal statute of limitations having been passed,
the question remained whether Congress intended that the doctrine of fraudulent
concealment be read into the statute.
I. ORIGINS OF THE DOCTRINE
The doctrine of fraudulent concealment, as developed at common law, was
explicitly recognized in Bailey v. Glover,6 further developed in Exploration Co.
v. United States,7 and given universal application in Holrmberg v. Arinbrecht.8
In Bailey v. Glover, an assignee in bankruptcy brought an action to avoid a
fraudulent conveyance. 9 The applicable statute of limitations'0 apparently
barred the action. However, the Court, applying the doctrine of fraudulent
1. 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1964).
2. Moviecolor, Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
821 (1961) (New York law); Suckow Borax Mines Consol., Inc. v. Borax Consol., Ltd., 185
F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 943 (1951) (California law); Burnham
Chem. Co. v. Borax Consol., Ltd., 170 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 924
(1949) (California law); Zimmerer v. General Elec. Co., 126 F. Supp. 690 (D. Conn.
1954) (Connecticut law); see 31 Fordham L. Rev. 812, 816 (1963).
3. In Burnham Chem. Co. v. Borax Consol., Ltd., 170 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 336 U.S. 924 (1949), the applicable statute of limitations was three years, while In
American Tobacco Co. v. People's Tobacco Co., 204 F. 58 (5th Cir. 1913), the applicable
Louisiana statute of limitations was only one year. The nightmarish results to be obtained
under such a random system are best highlighted by the situation in Winkler-Koch Eng'r Co.
v. Universal Oil Prod. Co., 100 F. Supp. 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). In that case, involving multiple
defendants, the controlling statutes of limitations were the Kansas three year statute as to
some injuries, the Kansas two year statute as to others, the New York six year statute as to
others, and finally the New York three year statute as to the rest.
4. The prior situation where the state statute would be borrowed led to "forum shop-
ping." Congress attempted to remedy this unfortunate use of state statutes by providing for
a uniform statutory period. 31 Fordham L. Rev. 812, 816 (1963); see H.R. Rep. No. 422,
84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955) ; S. Rep. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1964).
6. 88 U.S. 342 (1874).
7. 247 U.S. 435 (1918).
8. 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
9. 88 U.S. at 342-43.
10. Bankrupcty Act § 2, 14 Stat. 518 (1867), 11 U.S.C. § 29(e) (1964).
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concealment, reasoned that "[t]o hold that by concealing a fraud . . . in a
manner that it concealed itself until such time as the party committing the fraud
could plead the statute of limitations to protect it, is to make the law which was
designed to prevent fraud the means by which it is made successful and
secure."'" The Court held that the statute will be tolled where the fraud has been
concealed or is of such a nature as to be self-concealing and the plaintiff has not
been guilty of negligence or laches in failing to discover it.'2 This decision was
followed in other bankruptcy cases. 13
The Bailey doctrine was given wider application in Exploration Co. v. United
States. There the government brought an action to cancel certain land patents.
It alleged that the defendant, furthering a design to exploit the lands in question,
had employed agents who secretly obtained patents on these lands." A six year
statute of limitations, which made no reference to the presence or absence of due
diligence, clearly barred any cause of action." The Court felt compelled, none-
theless, to heed the dictates of Bailey. It observed that the Bailey rule had
already been established at the time the statute was passed, and thus the statute
was presumably passed with the doctrine in mind.' 6
The action in the Exploration case was based on fraud, as was the Bailey
suit, and for many years it was argued that the fraudulent concealment doctrine
applied only to actions grounded in fraud.'- Such arguments should have been
laid to rest in 1946 by Holmberg v. Armbrecht. Holmberg involved a suit in
equity to enforce the liability imposed by the Federal Farm Loan Act 18 on
shareholders of a joint stock land bank. One of the shareholders had concealed
his holdings under another name. The bank dosed in 1932, and the petitioners
alleged that they had not learned of the concealment until 1942.12 The Court
11. 88 U.S. at 349.
12. Id. at 349-50.
13. Avery v. Cleary, 132 U.S. 604 (1890); Kirby v. Lake Shore & Mich. S.R.R., 120 U.S.
130 (1887); Traer v. Clews, 115 U.S. 528 (1885); Rosenthal v. Walker, III US. 185 (1884);
Linn & Lane Timber Co. v. United States, 196 F. 593 (9th Cir. 1912).
14. 247 U.S. at 436-37.
15. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 559, § 8, 26 Stat. 1093 (1891) (actions to vacate or annul
patents).
16. 247 US. at 449. The Court stated that: "We cannot believe that Congress intended to
give immunity to those who for the period named in the statute might be able to conceal
their fraudulent action from the knowledge of the agents of the Government."
17. In Brigham City Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 210 F. Supp. 574 (D. Utah 1962), rev'd,
315 F.2d 306 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 809 (1963), the court observed: "The
so-called doctrine of fraudulent concealment can be neither expressed nor applied without
reference to the principle of fraud undiscovered in spite of the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence." Id. at 579. In Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 210 F. Supp.
557 (N.D. IlI. 1962), aff'd, 315 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1963), the court noted that "[dlefendants
limit the Holmberg doctrine to cases where fraud is the gravamen of the action, and as
inapplicable to substantive legislation providing for punitive damages." Id. at 570 (footnote
omitted).
18. 12 U.S.C. § 812 (1964).
19. 327 U.S. at 393.
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made it quite clear that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment applied even to
actions not based on fraud.20 In fact, the Court, in dictum, stated that "[t ] his
equitable doctrine is read into every federal statute of limitation." 21
As recently as the "electrical equipment cases," 22 however, the existence of
such a doctrine and its applicability to the antitrust statute of limitations has
been contested. 23 In those cases the defendants argued first that the doctrine
of fraudulent concealment applied only in fraud cases, 24 and, second, that it
was not applicable in antitrust cases since Congress had passed the antitrust
statute of limitations without reference to fraudulent concealment. 25 Several
lower courts accepted this argument,26 but such holdings were short-lived 27 and
the doctrine is now firmly established in the antitrust field.
28
20. Id. at 393-94.
21. Id. at 397.
22. The "electrical equipment cases" involved manufacturers of heavy electrical equipment,
principally Westinghouse Electric Co. and General Electric Co., who conspired to fix prices
in that industry. The conspiracy began in 1948 and was not discovered until the Government
brought an action in 1960. Subsequently, the consumer-victims of the conspiracy brought over
1700 law suits throughout the country in what has been the most extensive antitrust litigation
in history. Ultimately, the plaintiffs recovered over $600,000,000. See 31 Fordham L. Rev.
812, 814 (1963). In the Southern District of New York alone, 418 actions were brought. Note,
Clayton Act Statute of Limitations and Tolling by Fraudulent Concealment, 72 Yale L.J.
600, 601 (1963).
23. General Elec. Co. v. City of San Antonio, 334 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1964); Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. v. City of Burlington, 326 F.2d 691 (D.C. Cir. 1964) ; Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
v. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co., 326 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1964).
24. Public Serv. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 315 F.2d 306, 310 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 374
U.S. 809 (1963); Brigham City Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 210 F. Supp. 574 (D. Utah 1962),
rev'd, 315 F.2d 306 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 809 (1963).
25. General Elec. Co. v. City of San Antonio, 334 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1964); Atlantic
City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 312 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S.
909 (1963).
26. Brigham City Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 210 F. Supp. 574 (D. Utah 1962), rev'd,
315 F.2d 306 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 809 (1963); Public Serv. Co. v. A.B.
Chance Co., 1962 Trade Cas. ff 70,551 (D.N.M. 1962), rev'd, 315 F.2d 306 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 374 U.S. 809 (1963); City of Kansas City v. Federal Pacific Elec. Co., 1962
Trade Cas. ff 70,453 (W.D. Mo.), rev'd, 310 F.2d 271 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373
U.S. 914 (1963).
27. General Elec. Co. v. City of San Antonio, 334 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1964) ; Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. v. City of Burlington, 326 F.2d 691 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 326 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1964); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Com-
monwealth Edison Co., 315 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1963); Public Serv. Co. v. General Elec. Co.,
315 F.2d 306 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 809 (1963) ; Kansas City v. Federal Pacific
Elec. Co., 310 F.2d 271 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963); Atlantic City
EIec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 312 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 909 (1963).
28. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in all of the "electrical equipment cases" It con-
sidered and in view of the damages involved, it is unlikely they would have done so bad they
thought there was any possibility of error. See notes 1-21 supra and accompanying text.
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II. FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT AS IT APPLIES TO THE
ANTITRUST STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
There are three distinct elements in the doctrine of fraudulent concealment:
(1) concealment by the defendant of plaintiff's cause of action; (2) lack of
knowledge by the plaintiff of the existence of his cause of action; and (3) a
reasonable probability that due diligence would fail to discover the cause of
action.29
A. Acts of Concealment by the Defendant
While it has been said that defendant must be found to have concealed either
the plaintiff's injury or the defendant's antitrust violation,30 it is not precisely
clear what conduct on the part of a defendant constitutes concealment. The
issue is obscured in most cases by consideration of the other elements of the
doctrine.31 The Bailey case suggested that tolling can result from either an
affirmative effort to maintain secrecy or from conduct which is insusceptible of
discovery and which the defendant may have taken no particular steps to
conceal. 32
Several other cases have indicated that there must be an affirmative misrepre-
tation to the plaintiff. 33 This grew out of the idea that some fraud must be
practiced on the plaintiff.3 4 However, the need for affirmative misrepresentation
was questioned in one of the "electrical equipment cases." In Ohio Valley
Electric Corp. v. General Electric Co.,35 the defendants falsified expense accounts
29. Dovberg v. Dow Chem. Co., 195 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Philco Corp. v.
Radio Corp. of America, 186 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Pa. 1960). All three elements are necessary,
and, should any be missing, there is no tolling of the statute of limitations. Id. Obviously, if
the defendant attempts to conceal the antitrust violation, and in spite of his efforts the
plaintiff discovers his cause of action, there is no tolling.
30. Suckow Borax Mines Consol., Inc. v. Borax Consol., Ltd., 185 F.2d 196 (9th Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 943 (1951). In this regard it would appear that concealment of
the extent of the injury would not result in tolling if the injury itself was not concealed, since
the measure of damages, of course, is not a part of the cause of action.
31. Typical of this is Moviecolor, Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F2d 80 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 821 (1961), which discusses only the sufficiency of the allegations in
the complaint and ignores the conduct involved. In connection with this, the plaintiff must
allege with particularity the fraudulent concealment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9; see Wood v.
Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 140-41 (1879).
32. 88 U.S. at 349. It is quite clear, however, that simply because a plaintiff was not aw-are
of his cause of action or of facts forming the basis for that cause of action, there has not
necessarily been conduct concealing that cause of action. Moviecolor, Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 288 F.2d 80, 87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 821 (1961) ; see Dawson, Fraudulent
Concealment and Statutes of Limitation, 31 Mich. L. Rev. 875, 916 (1933).
33. Laundry Equip. Sales Corp. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 334 F.2d 788, 792 (7th Cir. 1964);
Norman Tobacco & Candy Co. v. Gillette Safety Razor Co., 197 F. Supp. 333, 338 (ND.
Ala. 1960), aff'd, 295 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1961). See also Burnham Chem. Co. v. Borax
Consol., Ltd., 170 F.2d 569, 573-74 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1948), cert denied, 336 U.S. 924 (1949).
34. American Tobacco Co. v. People's Tobacco Co., 204 F. 58, 62-63 (5th Cir. 1913).
35. 244 F. Supp. 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). The court held that direct misrepresentations to
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to obscure the purpose of their meetings, made telephone calls at night from pay
telephones rather than from their offices, destroyed notes taken at their meetings
and instructed newcomers to maintain secrecy with regard to the conspiracy. 80
The defendants argued that those acts were not a fraud as to these plaintiffs
and were not related to them. Therefore, it was contended that the acts com-
plained of constituted mere silence and were thus not sufficient to toll the
statute.37 The court rejected this contention, reasoning that "such restrictive
interpretations of the doctrine of fraudulent concealment are hardly required by
the cases, and negate the policy behind the doctrine."'38 In its discussion of this
argument, the court raised an interesting issue. "Assuming that plaintiffs must
prove more than 'mere silence' by defendants-an assumption which in an anti-
trust conspiracy case may not be correct-the acts proved satisfy this require-
ment."'39 The possibility of tolling by silence was thus left open.
the plaintiff were not required but rather "acts concealing the conspiracy by the participants
therein tolled the statute . . . " Id. at 933.
36. So effective were the defendants' evasions that even the president of General Electric
was unaware of the conspiracy and it took the Government eighteen months and the testimony
of more than five hundred witnesses before four grand juries to uncover the facts. Id. at 932.
In fact, the claimed ignorance of the president was held to be evidence which could be used to
establish that due diligence would not have uncovered the conspiracy. Philadelphia Elec.
Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1964 Trade Cas. 1 71,123, at 79,444 (E.D. Pa. 1964). In a
similar case, Illinois v. Sperry Rand Corp., 237 F. Supp. 520 (NJ). Ill. 1965), the plaintiff
charging price fixing, alleged that the conspiracy was fraudulently concealed by various
means and methods to avoid detection and that secret meetings were held in hotels and a
private residence was set up at which the defendants held meetings and allocated jobs and
fixed prices. Then a defendant would be called and informed as to who was to get the job,
and the other defendants would submit bids calculated to insure this. In deciding a motion to
strike allegations from the complaint, the court held that the allegations were sufficient to
raise the issue of fraudulent concealment.
37. The defendants argued neither that the plaintiffs knew or should have known of the
conspiracy nor that the acts of concealment alleged occurred, but rather they urged that they
did not constitute affirmative acts of misrepresentation. Ohio Valley Elec. Co. v. General
Elec. Co., 244 F. Supp. 914, 932. It is interesting to note that the defendants frequently
changed their tactics throughout the course of extensive litigation, at one time claiming
that the plaintiffs knew of their cause of action, Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 1964 Trade Cas. 1 71,123, at 79,443, while at others ignoring this point. The de-
fendants even pleaded alternatively that there was no conspiracy but, even if there were, the
plaintiffs had full knowledge of it. 11 Antitrust Bull. 729 (1966).
38. 244 F. Supp. at 932-33 (footnotes omitted). The doctrine of fraudulent concealment as
annunciated in Holmberg v. Armbrecht does not require that there be any misrepresentation
but merely requires concealment. It certainly makes very little sense to hold that there has
been no concealment simply because the defendant has neglected to make misrepresentations
to the plaintiff although he has made every other effort to conceal his conduct from the
plaintiff. See American Tobacco Co. v. People's Tobacco Co., 204 F. 58, 63 (5th Cir. 1913).
39. 244 F. Supp. at 932 (footnotes omitted). In so saying the court relied on Moviecolor,
Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80, 87, wherein that court, in dictum, indicated that
affirmative acts of concealment may not be necessary in cases of conspiracy to restrain trade.
In this the court relied on an unfortunate interpretation of American Tobacco Co. v. People's
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Another case suggests that affirmative acts are not essential to concealment.
In American Tobacco Co. v. People's Tobacco Co.,40 the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit approved of a charge by the trial court instructing the jury to
consider solely whether plaintiff knew or should have known of his cause of
action.41 This has led many to believe that no affirmative act of concealment
is necessary in order to toll the statute of limitations.42 However, it must be
remembered that there had already been a finding of concealment by the
defendants and the only issue to be determined was the plaintiff's knowledge.
43
A better justification for the decision was that the activities of the defendants
were self-concealing, and thus within another phase of the Bailey prohibitions.
The more widely-known element of the Bailey doctrine involves affirmative
acts of concealment, but there is a second and lesser known element. If the
defendant's activities are of such a nature that they conceal themselves, then
even though the defendant may have taken no steps to conceal them, there will
be a tolling of the statute of limitations. The American Tobacco case, among
others, elucidates the application of this principle of self-concealment to the
antitrust statute of limitations. In American Tobacco, the court found the rela-
tionship between American and Craft had been concealed in order to avoid
labor problems for Craft since American was on labor's unfair list. The defen-
dants argued that the concealment, therefore, only incidentally encompassed
the antitrust violation. The court, however, found that "the fact of the conceal-
ment of the combination between the American and the Craft Tobacco com-
panies and Craft is nonetheless a concealment,... so far as the suspension of
the running of the statute against the People's Tobacco Company is concerned."
4
'
In Crummer Co. v. DuPont,4 5 the plaintiffs charged defendants with con-
spiring to force them out of business. Defendants, inter alia, secretly instituted
proceedings by making complaints to government agencies. The plaintiffs claimed
this conduct, by its nature, amounted to fraudulent concealment, saying the
fraudulent use by the appellees of the governmental bodies whose investigations
are by law largely kept secret necessarily resulted in the degree of concealment
which, if successful, would toll the running of the statute.40 The court agreed
Tobacco Co., 204 F. 58 (5th Cir. 1913). Interestingly enough, the court cites a law review
article which itself relies on American Tobacco. Dawson, Fraudulent Concealment and
Statutes of Limitation, 31 Mich. L. Rev. 880, 907-OS (1933). Cf. Developments in the Law-
Statutes of Limitations, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1177, 1221 (1950).
40. 204 F. 58 (5th Cir. 1913).
41. Id. at 60.
42. Moviecolor, Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 821 (1961); Ohio Valley Elec. Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 244 F. Supp. 914 (S.D.N.Y.
1965); McSweeney, The Statute of Limitations in Treble Damage Actions Under the Federal
Antitrust Laws--When the Period Begins and Tolling by Government Actions and Fraud-
ulent Concealment, 11 Antitrust Bull. 717, 730 (1966).
43. 204 F. 58, 62-63 (5th Cir. 1913).
44. Id. at 63.
45. 255 F.2d 425 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 884 (1958).
46. Id. at 432.
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with the plaintiffs, finding that this activity did amount to fraudulent conceal-
ment of defendants' scheme. 47
In Winkler-Koch Engineering Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co.,48 the defen-
dants were charged with conspiracy to drive the plaintiffs from competition in
the cracking equipment and process field. The defendants had, by bribing a
judge, obtained a ruinous patent infringement judgment against the plaintiff.
The court held that the statute of limitations was tolled until the plaintiff first
learned of the fraud.49
Thus, self-concealing activity seems to be that type of activity which, while
obviously damaging, does not reveal the source of the damage. It may have been
best described in Gaetzi v. Carling Brewing Co.,60 where it was said the statute
of limitations is tolled where the defendant's conduct "necessarily had the effect
of thwarting or long delaying discovery that an actionable wrong had occurred.
It was not the mere existence of an illegal conspiracy which tolled the statute,
but rather the presence of special circumstances which inevitably caused the
plaintiff to remain in ignorance that a wrong had been committed."' 1 Since it
seems clear that the defendant must perform some affirmative act, or at least act
in a manner which necessarily has the effect of concealing the defendant's
activities, it would also seem clear that mere silence does not toll the statute of
limitations. However, several courts have suggested that silence may well toll
the statute of limitations.52
If silence is to be defined as either saying nothing to anyone" or just refusing
to answer plaintiff's questions, 54 how is a denial of the conspiracy or injury to be
classified? In Burnham Chemical Co. v. Borax Consolidated Ltd., 5 the defendant
in conversations with the plaintiff specifically denied that there was any con-
spiracy. The court held that such denials were only "silence" and did not attain
the stature of conduct which amounted to fraudulent concealment. 0 On the
47. Id.
48. 100 F. Supp. 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
49. Id. at 29.
50. 205 F. Supp. 615 (E.D. Mich. 1962).
51. Id. at 620.
52. Ohio Valley Elec. Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 244 F. Supp. 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), says
this may be the case, relying on Moviecolor, Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 821 (1961). Moviecolor in turn relies on a misinterpretation of
American Tobacco Co. v. People's Tobacco Co., 204 F. 58 (5th Cir. 1913), which does not
stand for this proposition and did not state it. However, the better-reasoned opinions have
found that silence including a refusal to answer the plaintiff's questions is not enough.
Gaetzi v. Carling Brewing Co., 205 F. Supp. 615 (E.D. Mich. 1962); Philco Corp. v. RCA,
186 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Pa. 1960); Zimmerer v. General Elec. Co., 126 F. Supp. 690, 693
(D. Conn. 1954). The danger of the former opinions is that they may lead to a mortal
constriction of the statute of limitations.
53. Zimmerer v. General Elec. Co., 126 F. Supp. 690 (D. Conn. 1954).
54. Gaetzi v. Carling Brewing Co., 205 F. Supp. 615 (ED. Mich. 1962).
55. 170 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 924 (1949).
56. Id. at 577 n.4.
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other hand, in Philco Corp. v. Radio Corporation of Ancrica,"' the court, by way
of dictum, indicated that denials were affirmative acts of fraudulent conceal-
ment.5 8 If the traditional fraud attitude is maintained here then Philco must be
deemed correct. It would certainly seem that if there is to be a doctrine of fraud-
ulent concealment, it makes little sense to hold that affirmative denials to the
plaintiff are not affirmative acts of concealment.59
B. Knowledge of the Plaintiff
The second aspect of fraudulent concealment is the plaintiff's lack of knowl-
edge of his cause of action. The knowledge necessary to defeat the fraudulent
concealment defense is bipartite. Plaintiff must have both knowledge of facts
constituting the cause of action and knowledge that they amount to an antitrust
violation. There are several examples of this. In American Tobacco Co. v. Peo-
ple's Tobacco Co.,6° the plaintiff had alleged that the defendants had conspired
to injure it. With respect to the statute of limitations, the trial court charged the
jury that
it begins to run from the moment or the day that the petitioner knows that he has
suffered an actionable injury. That does not mean that it would begin to run if he
merely knew his profits were falling off, or he knew they were falling off from the
competition of the Craft Tobacco Company; but it would begin to run if he knew that
the falling off or damage was caused by the competition to effect and in pursuance of
an illegal combination and restraint of trade. In other words, from the moment he kmew
he could bring an action against somebody to recover his damages, although he might
not have known who the person was, or he might not have known how he was going to
prove his action, prescription would run, and after the lapse of one year his right of
action would be barred.61
Subsequent cases, in dictum, have indicated the charge was perhaps too favor-
able to the defendant. For example in Crummer Co. v. DuPont,62 a much higher
degree of knowledge was found to be necessary to immunize the defendant from
tolling. There the court reasoned that if joint action is a necessary element of the
relevant antitrust prohibition, the plaintiff must realize that he is the victim of a
conspiracy and not simply that several defendants individually are trying to
drive him out of business.es
In Philco Corp. v. Radio Corporation of America 4 the plaintiffs charged the
defendants with conspiracy to restrain trade, eliminate competition and monop-
olize the electronics field. The conspiracy charges centered around a meeting
57. 186 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
58. Id. at 163.
59. It is interesting to note that if the defendant tells the plaintiff that he has no cause of
action, he has made only a misrepresentation of law, which has been held not to be an act of
concealment. Gaetzi v. Carling Brewing Co., 205 F. Supp. 615, 623 (ED. Afich. 1962).
60. 204 F. 58, 63 (5th Cir. 1913).
61. Id. at 60.
62. 255 F.2d 425 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 884 (1958).
63. Id. at 431.
64. 186 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
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between the president of RCA and the president and vice-president of GE.
Subsequently, however, the vice-president of GE told the president of Philco of
the agreement reached at this meeting. The court found that the plaintiff, there-
fore, was in possession of facts which "it then recognized as constituting an
interference . . . [with their] contract negotiations and 'a violation of the anti-
trust laws.' "5 Furthermore, the court said:
We emphasize the point that they were not given facts which might create suspicion
or indicate the possibility of a claim for relief based upon the antitrust laws. Rather
they were given the essential facts now constituting their claim for relief (minus only
the fact of injury to the public and to themselves). And they recognized them as con-
stituting a cause of action at that time.66
Most cases on this point involve antitrust violations whereby a competitor is
forced out of business and therefore is well aware of his injury. 7 In such situa-
tions, the only inquiry is whether the plaintiff knew or should have known that
he had a cause of action. There are conflicting opinions on this question. In
Suckow Borax Mines Consolidated, Inc. v. Borax Consolidated, Ltd.,0 8 plaintiffs
claimed that there was a "general conspiracy" to injure them. They first learned
of this conspiracy when the Government instituted proceedings against defen-
dants in 1944. The defendants introduced evidence that on several occasions the
plaintiffs and their attorneys charged the defendant Borax and its subsidiaries
with price fixing, attempting to create a monopoly and trying to force Suckow
Co. out of business in violation of the antitrust laws. 69 The plaintiffs contended
that while this was true, they were not aware that defendants had not been
acting alone.70 The court, rejecting this contention, held that knowledge of the
precise elements of a general conspiracy was immaterial since
at all times pertinent to this inquiry appellants knew and believed that they were being
grievously damaged by Borax Ltd. and its subsidiaries and agents and were keenly
aware that the acts of appellees had caused and were causing damages, and knew, or
had reason to believe, and did believe, that these acts were committed in violation of
Federal antitrust laws. Thus the ultimate and determinative facts constituting the legal
basis of this action were known to appellants. 71
In Crummer Co. v. DuPont72 the plaintiffs, who were dealers in securities,
charged the defendants with a conspiracy to drive them out of business by
fraudulently using Government agencies to harass them. There was evidence that
the plaintiffs were aware that they were being injured by the defendants and
in fact their attorney had made charges to that effect. Furthermore, Crummer
65. Id. at 164.
66. Id.
67. E.g., Laundry Equip. Sales Corp. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 334 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1964).
68. 185 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 943 (1951).
69. Id. at 200-02.
70. Id. at 204.
71. Id. at 209.
72. 255 F.2d 425 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 884 (1958).
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himself wrote a letter in 1947 to the Justice Department which implied that he
was aware of his cause of action in 1946, before the statutory three-year period.3
The plaintiffs claimed that while they knew they were being injured, they did not
realize that they were the victims of a conspiracy of all of the defendants. In
fact, the lawyers, hired to investigate the source of the complaints prompting the
government action, were unable to uncover the conspiracy. 74 The court decided
that, on this evidence, it could not be said as a matter of law that the plaintiffs
had knowledge of their cause of action before the statute of limitations ran out. n
Similarly, in Dovberg v. Dow Chemical Co.,7 6 the plaintiffs alleged that
defendants conspired to destroy their business in violation of the Sherman, 7
Clayton7" and Robinson-Patman 79 Acts. There was evidence that on several
occasions retailer defendants told the plaintiffs that the plaintiff's chief com-
petitor was attempting to destroy their business. The court held that such
evidence goes to a possible knowledge that one of the defendants was attempting
to injure the plaintiff, but does not show a knowledge of concerted action by
all.80 Thus the law on this point is somewhat confused and Suckow and Cruynmer
seem to be in conflict. Suckow states that plaintiff need know only that several of
defendants' activities are injuring him, while Crummncr apparently requires an
additional realization that the several defendants have actually conspired to
injure him. The position of the Suckow court is not unreasonable. It seems sound
not to require that the plaintiff come to a knowledge of the details of the con-
spiracy when he is already aware of the defendants' individual activities. Indeed,
many antitrust violations, such as those prohibited by section 2 of the Sherman
Act, do not require a conspiracy. However, the better rule might be to require
that the plaintiff be aware of the violation of the antitrust laws, and if conspiracy
is a necessary element of the violation, then only knowledge of the existence of
the conspiracy will start the statute of limitations running.
73. Id. at 430.
74. Id.
75. The court noted that: "It is stipulated that appellants did not learn until December
27, 1946, what caused the Federal agents to 'move in.' If a jury believes that they moved in
as a part of a conspiracy between these appellees to ruin appellants' business and run them
out of Florida, which, for the purpose of this appeal, is assumed, then it might well find that
Crummer did not have knowledge of this conspiracy until he learned that 'Main and Wheeler
started the Federal investigation that, although finally dismissed, did bring about their
financial ruin. So, too, could a jury find that the two letters from Ball to the Florida Securities
Commission, one indicating knowledge of the presumedly secret Fuller report and the other
immediately preceeding the beginning of quo w-arranto proceedings by the Commission gave
a connecting link to tie the Ball-duPont interests to the Fuller investigation and the effort
to deprive Crummer of the benefits of his City of Inverness contract." Id. at 432.
76. 195 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
77. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
78. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1964).
79. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1964).




Finally, the plaintiffs, if on notice of the antitrust violation, must show either
that they exercised reasonable diligence and still could not discover their cause
of action or that reasonable diligence would not have led to discovery of the facts.
It is quite clear that once put on notice, a plaintiff is required to exercise reason-
able diligence to discover his cause of action and once having discovered it to
be diligent in bringing suit.81 There is some question, however, as to what con-
stitutes notice.
Starview Outdoor Threatre, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp.,82
gave a not too helpful definition of what is meant by being put on inquiry. There
it was said that it is obtaining a certain degree of notice, a certain amount of
knowledge and some reasonable suspicion. To complicate this definition further,
the court added that its definition was set forth in the context of summary
judgment.83 Even though its language was somewhat lacking in specificity, the
holding of the case offers some insight into the nature of reasonable notice. The
court found that the attorneys for the plaintiffs had written to the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice charging the defendants with attempting
to monopolize the supply of motion pictures. At that time, the Justice Depart-
ment informed the plaintiffs that the transaction complained of was not an
antitrust violation. The court held, however, that this did not negate the
plaintiff's knowledge of the alleged antitrust violations,84 thus indicating that
notice sufficient to excite inquiry need not be unequivocal or uncontradicted.
There is a helpful discussion of reasonable notice in Tobacco and Allied
Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp." There the plaintiffs alleged a violation of
rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission 80 promulgated under
§ 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.87 The court found the case was
based on fraud and in discussing whether the plaintiffs exercised reasonable
diligence in discovering the fraud, the court said:
What on the one hand is tantamount to an actual discovery of fraud should not be
confused with what on the other carries a duty to investigate. It is impossible to lay
down any general rule as to the amount of evidence or number or nature of evidential
facts admitting discovery of fraud. But, facts in the sense of indisputable proof or any
proof at all, are different from facts calculated to excite inquiry which impose a duty
of reasonable diligence and which, if pursued, would disclose the fraud. Facts in the
latter sense merely constitute objects of direct experience and, as such, may comprise
rumors or vague charges if of sufficient substance to arouse suspicion. Thus, the duty
of reasonable diligence is an obligation imposed by law solely under the peculiar cir-
cumstances of each case, including existence of a fiduciary relationship, concealment
81. Gaetzi v. Carling Brewing Co., 205 F. Supp. 615 (E.D. Mich. 1962).
82. 254 F. Supp. 855 (N.D. I1. 1966).
83. Id. at 857.
84. Id.
85. 143 F. Supp. 323 (D. Del. 1956).
86. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10-5 (1967).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
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of the fraud, opportunity to detect it, position in the industry, sophistication and
expertise in the financial community, and knowledge of related proceedings.ss
While this statement was in the context of a failure by a majority shareholder to
reveal special facts to the minority in a sale of stock, it nevertheless does shed
light on the question at hand.
Other cases have indicated that where the plaintiff had been asked to join
a conspiracy which ultimately made him its victim, he had sufficient knowledge
to put him on notice of the defendant's activities8s Even if there had been con-
tradictory evidence, the plaintiff had to have exercised reasonable diligence, o°
Under the Starview test, seemingly any scintilla of evidence would be sufficient
to require reasonable diligence. Thus Starview would seem to require potential
antitrust plaintiffs to engage in extensive investigations in a never-ending search
for antitrust violations. The flexible Transamerica test seems more sound.
III. CONCLUSION
The basic problem presented by the fraudulent concealment doctrine in anti-
trust law is its tendency to undermine the effectiveness of the statute of limita-
tions. The antitrust statutes often make conspiracy a required element of their
violation, and conspirators are by their nature secretive. Therefore, unless we are
prepared to subvert the statute of limitations in its entirety, mere silence by the
defendants can not be made the equivalent of fraudulent concealment.
Perhaps the doctrine should be confined to cases, such as Crummer and Wink-
ler-Koch, where the conspirators utilize outside agencies to effectuate their plans,
thereby insuring that their own activities not be suspect. In any event, if no
restrictions are placed on the application of the doctrine, almost anything which
is not in fact discovered could be termed self-concealing. For example, in a
price-fixing conspiracy, the consumer plaintiff rarely realizes that he is being
overcharged. Are we to say, therefore, that price-fixing is by its nature self-
concealing? Such an interpretation leads to indiscriminate tolling.
88. 143 F. Supp. at 331.
89. In Foster & Kelser Co. v. Special Site Sign Co., 85 F.2d 742 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
299 U.S. 613 (1936), decided under California law, the plaintiff sued in a private antitrust
action because of an alleged conspiracy by defendant to monopolize the outdoor advertising
business. The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the statute of limitations was tolled by
reason of defendant's fraudulent concealment of the cause of action. The court held to the
contrary, finding that the plaintiff was at one time asked to join the conspiracy which
indicated knowledge sufficient to put it on notice of the defendant's activities.
90. In Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Orr, 319 F2d 612 (5th Cir. 1963) (Texas law),
the plaintiff sued the defendants to recover the value of oil and gas defendants had produced
by using slant-holes. The plaintiff alleged that while there were facts to put it on notice, the
defendant's conduct was such as to relieve it of its duty to inquire. There was evidence of an
honest report by an independent concern showing that there were no slant-holes. However,
this report was somewhat incomplete, and the court found that the plaintiff could not rely
blindly on this in the face of a report by one of its own engineers that it was the victim of a
slant-hole. The court found that this was sufficient notice to require the exercise of reasonable
diligence.
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Prior to the "electrical equipment cases," application of the doctrine of fraud-
ulent concealment bad been favorable to defendants. Those cases presented a
situation of extreme damage to the plaintiffs and involved sufficient acts of
affirmative concealment to justify invocation of the doctrine. Thus, they were
quite correct on their facts, but future development of their sometimes broad
statements of the law could lead to a much wider application of the doctrine.
In cases of less social import, this would be clearly undesirable.
